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Kirsten A. Dauphinais 
A lawyer in a free country, should have all the requisites of Quintilian’s orator. 
He should be a person of irreproachable virtue and goodness. He should be 
well read in the whole circle of the arts and sciences. He should be fit for the 
administration of public affairs, and to govern the commonwealth by his coun-
cils, establish it by his laws, and correct it by his example. 
James Kent, Professor, Columbia University School of Law, 17941 
This Article argues that modern legal educators should revisit Quintilian, 
the quintessential law professor, by intentionally implementing his recom-
mended pedagogical strategies in the law school classroom and curriculum. In 
recent decades, while the literature of law school teaching and learning has 
been casting about to find new paradigms for legal education in the face of 
widespread critique of impracticality and ineffectiveness, examination of the 
philosophies of the great Roman rhetors, and in particular, Quintilian and his 
principal work Institutio Oratoria, has largely been limited to jurisprudential 
and rhetorical study. However, a perch in the best practices of law school 
teaching and learning is Quintilian’s natural home. “Indeed, if we were to de-
sign the perfect course for training students to think and act like lawyers, it 
would be classical rhetoric, particularly from the Roman era.”2 And, among 
Roman philosophers, the most natural marriage of legal practice and training is 
to be found in Quintilian. 
I. WHO WAS QUINTILIAN? 
Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, known to posterity as Quintilian, was born 
approximately 35 AD in the province of Spain, a center for Roman culture.3 
When he was sixteen, he moved to the Roman capitol to complete his education 
with the famed orator, Domitius Afer.4 At twenty-five, he returned to his natal 
Spain to teach and practice law with recognized excellence; in 68 AD, Galba, 
the Spanish provincial governor who subsequently became Emperor of Rome, 
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1  James Kent, Professor of Law, Columbia Coll., An Introductory Lecture to a Course of 
Law Lectures (Nov. 17, 1794), in 3 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 338 (1903). 
2  Kristen K. Tiscione, How the Disappearance of Classical Rhetoric and the Decision to 
Teach Law as a “Science” Severed Theory from Practice in Legal Education, 51 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 385, 387 (2016). 
3  QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING xiii (James J. Murphy & Cleve 
Wiese eds., 2d ed. 2016). 
4  Id. 
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selected Quintilian to join his entourage returning to the capital.5 In Rome, 
Quintilian continued his career as a teacher and advocate,6 representing promi-
nent clients such as the Jewish queen, Berenice.7 Later, the Emperor Vespasian 
“established official professorships [with salaries] paid from the state treas-
ury,”8 and Quintilian was the first occupant of the Chair for Latin Rhetoric, 
with a princely salary of 100,000 sesterces,9 reflecting the great esteem with 
which he was held. He was lauded by the great poet Martial as, “O Quintilian, 
supreme guide of unsettled youth, Glory of the Roman toga, O Quintilian.”10 
Over the course of his career, Quintilian’s pupils included Pliny the 
Younger, the two grandnephews of the Emperor Justinian, and perhaps the 
famed Roman historians, Tacitus and Suetonius.11 In 88 AD, state authorities 
placed Quintilian in charge of Rome’s first public school.12 He retired in 90 
AD, at which time the Emperor Domitian conferred consular rank upon him, 
the first rhetor to have ever been so honored.13 It was during his retirement, 
from approximately 92 AD to 95 AD, that he penned his magnum opus, “Insti-
tutio [O]ratoria, or The Education of the Orator.”14 
II. QUINTILIAN: IN AND OUT OF RHETORICAL AND LEGAL VOGUE 
The Roman rhetorical tradition which Quintilian epitomized survived in 
essentially the same form for more than 400 years, finding its foundations in 
the fifth century BCE in the teachings of Corax of Syracuse.15 Its teaching be-
came standardized by the second century BCE as the core of the Roman educa-
tional system,16 though indeed it had also laid at the center of Greek education 
since at least 450 BCE, articulated by such rhetors as Isocrates, who had recog-
nized writing as the core component of the classical curriculum,17 and Aristotle, 
 
5  See id. 
6  Id. In this, he was unique: “Quintilian was . . . a blend of Isocrates . . . (who did not prac-
tice law) and Cicero the lawyer (who did not formally teach), for Quintilian both taught and 
practiced law.” Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting 
Legal Scholarship, Teaching and Ethics, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 813, 846 (2003). 
7  QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING, supra note 3, at xiii. 
8  Id. at xi. 
9  Id. Roughly equivalent to a modern $500,000. Id. 
10  Id. at xiv, li. 
11  Id. at xiv. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. at xv. 
15  Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 615 (1999). 
16  QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING, supra note 3, at xi; Frost, supra 
note 15, at 615. 
17  Richard Leo Enos, Ancient Greek Writing Instrument, in A SHORT HISTORY OF WRITING 
INSTRUCTION: FROM ANCIENT GREECE TO MODERN AMERICA 9, 34 (James J. Murphy ed., 2d 
ed. 2001). 
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who had embraced the importance of rhetoric as a subject.18 Thus, tracing a 
nearly 1,000 year history,19 rhetorical training would be preeminent among ed-
ucational techniques “until the fall of the [Roman] Empire in 410 [AD],”20 at 
which point any vestiges of democracy and free speech also fell, rendering the 
orators functionally unnecessary.21 
What remained of the Roman rhetorical education peaking with Quintilian 
passed quietly into the middle ages, with his treatises housed in dusty monastic 
libraries.22 Indeed, as the old manuscripts were housed by the Catholic Church, 
rhetoric lost many of its original civic uses and took on an ecclesiastical associ-
ation and flavor,23 consulted by religious scholars to resolve disputes in canon, 
philosophy, and theology.24 It was during this period that “law cease[d] to be a 
subdivision of rhetoric [and rose as] a subject in its own right,” with dedicated 
university departments.25 
Together with a passion for classical art, architecture, and science,26 rhetor-
ical education was brought back into the light of day by the fifteenth and six-
teenth century Humanist scholars of the Renaissance,27 where it reigned again 
for nearly two centuries, freed from restrictive grasp of the Church and restored 
to prominence in civic life.28 During this time, Quintilian also had no less a dis-
tinguished disciple than Protestant revolutionary Martin Luther, who lauded 
him “a model of eloquence . . . teach[ing] by a happy combination of theory 
and practice.”29 
However, opinion of rhetoric and Quintilian fissured again in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. On one hand, rhetorical education was the sub-
ject of critique by such scholars as the French philosopher and logician, Peter 
Ramus, who viewed Aristotle and his rhetor descendants to be inextricably 
linked with the Church and derided rhetoric as a field devoid of substance, 
 
18  See Frost, supra note 15, at 615. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Tiscione, supra note 2, at 392. 
Under the later emperors, . . . legal and political rhetoric became not civic duty, but rather 
grounds for imprisonment or death. Isocrates’ rhetorical education maintained importance as the 
basis of Roman education, but during this “Second Sophistic,” opportunities to speak were in-
creasingly relegated to ceremonial and trivial declamations, which focused on narrow matters of 
word choice and delivery, with topics far removed from the political and legal issues of the 
times, such as mythology. 
Scallen, supra note 6, at 845. 
22  See QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING, supra note 3, at xii. 
23  Frost, supra note 15, at 621. 
24  Id. (quoting RICHARD MCKEON, RHETORIC: ESSAYS IN INVENTION AND DISCOVERY xvi 
(Mark Backman ed., 1987)). 
25  Frost, supra note 15, at 621. 
26  Tiscione, supra note 2, at 392. 
27  QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING, supra note 3, at xii. 
28  See Frost, supra note 15, at 625; Tiscione, supra note 2, at 392–93. 
29  QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING, supra note 3, at xxxvii. 
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good only for education in expression, style, and delivery.30 The study of rheto-
ric continued to be divorced from the study of law and relegated to university 
English departments.31 Protestant and Puritan settlers of the American colonies, 
including, ultimately, the founders of Harvard University, bore the skeptical 
Ramian view to the New World.32 
On the other hand, rhetorical study would also find new champions in the 
seventeenth century, like Giambattista Vico, who reasserted that rhetoric was 
integral to the uncovering of knowledge.33 Quintilian’s philosophies and teach-
ings persisted, battered but alive, through the Enlightenment,34 were embraced 
in the London Inns of Court,35 and went on to deeply influence the Independ-
ence-era American Founding Fathers36 “as the law professors of our earliest cit-
izen-lawyers: John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison.”37 John 
Quincy Adams lauded: 
A subject, which has exhausted the genius of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quinctilian 
[sic], can neither require nor admit much additional illustration. To select, com-
bine, and apply their precepts, is the only duty left for their followers of all suc-
ceeding times, and to obtain a perfect familiarity with their instructions is to ar-
rive at the mastery of the art.38 
The resurgence of rhetoric as integral to legal education was dealt a body 
blow in the late nineteenth century by the advent of Christopher Columbus 
Langdell and the Socratic Method.39 Langdell’s “legal science”40 transformed 
law school into a primarily theoretical endeavor. Just as Ramism severed logic 
 
30  See Tiscione, supra note 2, at 392–93. 
31  Id. at 393. 
32  See id. 
33  Id. at 394. 
34  See Winifred Bryan Horner & Kerri Morris Barton, The Eighteenth Century, in THE 
PRESENT STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC 114, 120 
(Winifred Bryan Horner ed., 1990). Although the Classical rhetors still endured Ramian crit-
icism from such Enlightenment philosophers as Descartes who found the discipline shallow. 
Andrea Bianchi, International Adjudication, Rhetoric and Storytelling, 9 J. INT’L. DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 28, 40 (2018). John Locke criticized traditional rhetoric as an “instrument of 
error and deceit.” GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND 
SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 270–71 (2d ed. 1999). 
35  James Etienne Viator, Legal Education’s Perfect Storm: Law Students’ Poor Writing and 
Legal Analysis Skills Collide with Dismal Employment Prospects, Creating the Urgent Need 
to Reconfigure the First-Year Curriculum, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 735, 757 (2012). 
36  See Scallen, supra note 6, at 847. 
37  Id. at 818. 
38  Frost, supra note 15, at 613 (quoting 1 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LECTURES ON RHETORIC 
AND ORATORY 28–29 (Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1810)). 
39  Tiscione, supra note 2, at 394–95. 
40  Christopher C. Langdell, Dane Professor and Dean, Harvard Law School, Teaching Law 
as a Science (1886), in HARVARD UNIVERSITY 1636–1886: A RECORD OF THE 
COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHTH, 1866 ON THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE (John Wilson & Son, 1887), reprint-
ed in THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 514, 515 (Steve Sheppard 
ed., 1999). 
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from rhetoric, Langdell severed theory from practice and elevated it to the sole 
matter of import within legal education. 
The pendulum is in the process of swinging again. The late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries have seen the spark of a renewed interest in rhetoric 
by legal scholars: “[L]awyers are rhetors. They make arguments to convince 
other people. They deal in persuasion.”41 The renowned rhetorical scholar 
James Boyd White asserts, “law is a branch of rhetoric. Who, you may ask, 
could ever have thought it was anything else?”42 The virtues of the classics 
have again been urged by such modern masters of legal argument as Bryan 
Garner and Justice Antonin Scalia.43 This spark coincides with a campaign of 
serious consideration within legal education to again consciously promote skills 
training, such as that encompassed in rhetorical education, which promoted the 
rise of clinical legal education in the late 1960s and the discipline of legal writ-
ing in the 1970s and 80s.44 
This Article joins the call for renewed recognition of what already is: prac-
tice and theory are linked; content and delivery of legal argument form an in-
separable whole. The reintroduction of the study of classical rhetoric into legal 
education could be assigned reading for law students themselves with rhetorical 
techniques intentionally implemented in the law school classroom and moot 
courtroom, nourished by professors’ robust consideration of Quintilian’s ideas 
through the scholarship of law school teaching and learning. The study of clas-
sical rhetoric could be invaluable in healing the breach that began with Ramus, 
culminated in Langdell’s Socratic Method, and which persists through the pub-
lication of the germinal Carnegie Report,45 which condemns the fractured 
foundation of legal education and urges its repair once and for all.46 
 
III. QUINTILIAN’S CURRICULUM: FROM THE FORUM TO THE LAW SCHOOL OF 
TODAY 
Rhetoric, in its essence, “is the art of persuasion: the use of the analytical 
process to invent and arrange arguments, choose an appropriate speaking style, 
and deliver a convincing speech.”47 It considers persuasion in both theory and 
 
41  Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 
18 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 155, 177 (2006). 
42  James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Commu-
nal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985). 
43  David F. Herr, Book Review, FED. LAW. 58, 61 (Feb. 2009) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA 
& BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES (2008)). 
44  Tiscione, supra note 2, at 398–400. And, even in the face of pointed concern, the theo-
ry/practice hierarchy in law school is still promoted to this day with the lesser status fre-
quently accorded clinic and legal writing in the legal academy. Id. at 399. 
45  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION 
OF LAW 6, 8 (2007) [hereinafter The Carnegie Report]. 
46  See id. at 12. 
47  Id. at 390. 
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practice and recognizes that knowledge’s acquisition and expression were inex-
tricably intertwined,48 each enriching the other.49 The rhetorical curriculum en-
visioned by Quintilian imparted “detailed instruction[] for discovering” and de-
livering legal argument, both spoken and written, “in almost any [situation] and 
to almost any audience.”50 
The rhetorical education began and ended with the subject that “ma[kes] all 
other learning possible”—the use of language.51 Not all Roman citizens52 com-
pleted the full program of study, but most students of rhetoric completed much 
of the ten-to-twelve-year curriculum, beginning at age six or seven with alpha-
bet exercises and continuing through a dozen years of experiential classroom 
exercises to craft adult rhetors capable of conducting themselves publicly and 
effective in improvising in a multiplicity of circumstances.53 The boys would 
begin by studying grammar,54 “the art of inventing symbols and combining 
them to express thought,”55 then progress to logic and rhetoric as they got old-
er.56 
Quintilian diverged from his predecessors, the Greek Isocrates and the 
Roman orator Cicero, by insisting that education, as much as native ability, 
could produce rhetors of the highest order of excellence.57 “For facility is main-
ly the result of habit and exercise . . . .”58 Indeed, “[w]e must study, not only 
that every hearer may understand us, but that it shall be impossible for him not 
to understand us.”59 
A. Imitation, Memorization, and Recitation 
Quintilian recognized the key role memorization played in rhetorical edu-
cation, where, following in the footsteps of Aristotle and Cicero, the young ad-
vocate engaged in a program of memorization techniques in order to master the 
 
48  Id. at 400. 
49  Id. 
50  Frost, supra note 15, at 616. 
51  QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING, supra note 3, at x. 
52  Note, of course, that the term Roman citizen referred almost exclusively to rich, white 
men, a subject this Article will revisit. 
53  James J. Murphy, The Key Role of Habit in Roman Writing Instruction, in A SHORT 
HISTORY OF WRITING INSTRUCTION FROM ANCIENT GREECE TO MODERN AMERICA 36 (James 
J. Murphy ed., 2d ed. 2001). 
54  Tiscione, supra note 2, at 389. 
55  SISTER MIRIAM JOSEPH, THE TRIVIUM: THE LIBERAL ARTS OF LOGIC, GRAMMAR, AND 
RHETORIC 3 (Marguerite McGlinn ed. 2002). 
56  Tiscione, supra note 2, at 389. 
57  Scallen, supra note 6, at 846 n.137. 
58  4 THE INSTITUTIO ORATORIA OF QUINTILIAN bk. X, at 137 (H.E. Butler trans. 1961). 
59  1 HUGH BLAIR, LECTURES ON RHETORIC AND BELLES LETTRES 214 (1817). 
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extensive body of Roman law.60 Like his fellow Roman rhetorical instructors, 
Quintilian recommended the further step of imitation as a path to excellence,61 
as “the whole conduct of life is based on the desire of doing ourselves that 
which we approve in others.”62 
Through learning to recognize great writing, the fledgling advocate’s own 
writing could not help but to improve.63 This process of memorization and imi-
tation would be facilitated by regular, rigorous recitation and declamation on 
the part of the student through regular engagement in Quintilian’s fourteen 
progymnasmata, which were a regimen of basic exercises functioning as build-
ing blocks toward the creation and execution of entire performances of practice 
oratory.64 
These exercises included “descriptions, . . . narrative amplification, [the 
memorization of] maxims and fables, encomium,”65 vituperation,66 and, ulti-
mately, staking out and justifying positions of law.67 These acts of declamation 
served multiple ends, including “alerting students’ ears to the pronunciation, 
rhythms, vowel lengths, and meters of a work. . . . Through this technique, stu-
dents learned to recognize, remember, and imitate the metrical harmonies of 
language.”68 
By following this regimented process, the fledgling orator could endeavor 
to “surpass what ha[d] already been done,”69 for “[i]t [was] dishonorable even 
to rest satisfied with simply equaling what [was] imitate[d].”70 Similar imitative 
processes have been recommended by legal writing professors of today: 
We might consider beginning with a short piece the student can duplicate. Rep-
licating work was often seen as a vehicle for careful and detailed critique of 
well-regarded writing. By carefully reproducing, by hand, each capital letter, 
 
60  KRISTEN KONRAD ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 101–02 (2009); Gabriel H. Teninbaum, Spaced 
Repetition: A Method for Learning More Law in Less Time, 17 J. HIGH TECH. L. 273, 311  
(2017) (citing ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 113 (Thomas Sloane ed., 2001)). 
61  See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Rediscovering Cumulative Creativity from the Oral Formulaic 
Tradition to Digital Remix: Can I Get a Witness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.  
341 350 (2014). 
62  2 QUINTILIAN’S INSTITUTES OF ORATORY: EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR 278 (John Selby 
Watson trans., 1895). 
63  See Ronald J. Waicukauski et al., Ethos and the Art of Argument, 26 LITIG. 31, 31 (1999). 
64  Gideon O. Burton, The 14 Progymnasmata, http://rhetoric.byu.edu/Pedagogy/Progymna 
smata/Progymnasmata.htm [https://perma.cc/73YZ-EEXZ] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
65  Jennifer Kruse Hanrahan, Truth in Action: Revitalizing Classical Rhetoric as a Tool for 
Teaching Oral Advocacy in American Law Schools, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 299, 312 
(2003) (“in which the speaker praises his subject by developing details from his background 
and personal characteristics.”). 
66  Id. (“in which the author criticizes his subject by the same means.”). 
67  Id. 
68  Id. at 311. 
69  Id. 
70  2 QUINTILIAN’S INSTITUTES OF ORATORY, supra note 62 at 278–79. 
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each comma, and each word, the student is obliged to spend more time with the 
text then he might otherwise, gradually furthering his understanding of the writ-
er’s plan, framework, and approach to the topic while simultaneous developing 
in himself a broader reservoir of effective writing techniques.71 
These effective writing techniques remain ones invaluable to modern law 
students: 
Composing encomiums . . . and vituperations . . . alert the law student to tone 
and audience. Amplifying a quotation, as one would when practicing a chreia, 
proverb or maxim, aid the law student in learning how to persuasively develop 
an idea. Description teaches the law student to give greater attention to facts and 
details and improves storytelling abilities.72 
B. Delivery 
Quintilian thought oral delivery integral to the art of persuasion, rather than 
a desultory matter, unworthy of notice by a learned man, as discussed in Part II 
of this Article. Furthermore, Quintilian’s concept of delivery was equally con-
cerned with not only what was said, but the physical manner in which it was 
said.73 The young Roman rhetor advised, among other suggestions, to avoid 
distracting gross motor activities, like pacing and foot tapping,74 much as mod-
ern moot court students are advised today.75 Likewise, both Quintilian’s stu-
dents and law students of the modern era have been warned against “[a]ny fre-
netic movements . . . or wild gesticulation.”76 Quintilian’s intricate exegesis of 
demeanor merits study by law professors charged with teaching lawyering 
skills, moot court, and trial advocacy. 
Of course, as will be discussed further at the end of this Article, modern 
law students still struggle against, and can be marginalized by the ideal of a 
“vigorous and manly attitude,” which was very much embraced by the great 
 
71  Antonette Barilla, Inspiring Great Writing in Law Students, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. F. 47, 49 
(2015). Professor DeForrest relays: 
In law school, one common way of educating future lawyers about persuasive argumentation is 
the “learn by example” method. This method involves a professor guiding students through vari-
ous persuasive writing techniques via the examination of literature, sample briefs, oral argu-
ments, or court decisions in the expectation that the students will learn which rhetorical tech-
niques to embrace or avoid. While the “learn by example” method does have certain weaknesses 
when it comes to helping students to grasp the process of legal writing, it is a tried and true 
method, and is an effective method for teaching the particular format and structure of drafting 
legal arguments. 
Mark DeForrest, Introducing Persuasive Legal Argument via The Letter from a Birmingham 
City Jail, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 109, 110 (2009). 
72  Hanrahan, supra note 65, at 312 (emphasis removed). 
73  See Daphne O’Regan, Eying the Body: The Impact of Classical Rules for Demeanor, 
Credibility, Bias, and the Need to Blind Legal Decision Makers, 37 PACE L. REV. 379, 383 
(2017). 
74  Id. at 395. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 396 (alterations in original). 
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Roman rhetors.77 Modern legal educators must examine such advice through 
the lens of historical and cultural relativism: 
[A] proper masculine voice is achieved through walking, massage, abstinence 
from sex, easy digestion of foods, that is, “frugalitas.” These are regimes of an 
athlete, a warrior, and a philosopher, scaled down to a more attainable level. 
Those who fail run the risk of “the ‘feeble shrillness’ that characterizes the voic-
es of ‘eunuchs, women, and invalids.’ ”78 
For the ancient rhetors, urging the cultivation of a masculine affect was un-
troubling in a world where the practice of rhetoric was forbidden to women: 
It is prohibited to women to plead on behalf of others. And indeed there is rea-
son for the prohibition: lest women mix themselves up in other people’s cases, 
going against the chastity that befits their gender.79 
Women are still chastised by these speaking conventions in the present 
day. For instance, higher pitched voices in our culture have been deemed to 
signify a lack of gravitas and dismissed as excessively emotional.80 Thus, those 
of us with high pitched voices are admonished to try “to speak slowly and . . . 
lower the pitch,”81 lest we be viewed “incontinent.”82 But the modern legal 
skills educator, while taking advice from Quintilian, can also consider him an 
object lesson in the persistence of truly antique cultural norms. Ancient advice 
cannot be coopted wholesale. 
C. Liberal Arts Education for Law Students 
Cicero told us that in order “to be effective, an orator must be well educat-
ed,”83 having acquired knowledge of “everything important, and of all liberal 
arts . . . .”84 Quintilian and his predecessors, Cicero and Isocrates, believed “a 
liberal arts education as the best preparation for such civic leadership,”85 its 
breadth aiding the orator in effectively arguing across the spectrum of sub-
 
77  See CICERO, ORATOR 349 (H. M. Hubbell trans., 1962). 
78  O’Regan, supra note 73, at 391 n.54 (quoting 4 THE INSTITUTIO ORATORIA OF 
QUINTILIAN, supra note 58, at 19). 
79  C. Jan Swearingen, A Lover’s Discourse: Diotima, Logos, and Desire, in RECLAIMING 
RHETORICA: WOMEN IN THE RHETORICAL TRADITION 25, 26 (Andrea A Lunsford ed. 1995). 
Naturally, it goes without saying that the aspiring rhetor was a free, white man: “Conven-
tional markers of . . . servitude [were] fatal to credibility.” See O’Regan, supra note 73, at 
394, 401. 
80  Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to 
the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 48 n.206 (1998). 
81  Id. (citation omitted). 
82  See MAUD W. GLEASON, MAKING MEN: SOPHISTS AND SELF-PRESENTATION IN ANCIENT 
ROME 83 (1995). 
83  Tiscione, supra note 2, at 391. 
84  CICERO, DE ORATORE, reprinted in CICERO ON ORATORY AND ORATORS 48 (J.S. Watson 
ed. & trans. 1855). 
85  Scallen, supra note 6, at 819. 
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jects.86 For instance, the orator must have command of “rhetoric, poetics, histo-
ry (from which to draw examples), and moral philosophy.”87 Both Cicero and 
Quintilian acknowledged the significance of familiarity with great literature in 
order to effectively employ metaphor and simile, which are important instru-
ments to emotionally engage an audience.88 
Many modern legal educators agree. For instance, Professor Scallen states: 
“My students tend to come with liberal arts educations, although my law 
school, like most, does not require any particular type of undergraduate degree. 
The better their liberal arts education in terms of rigor, breadth, and depth, the 
more they will engage in my class.”89 She also asserts that a broad and effective 
liberal arts education in preparation for legal studies can be the best equalizer in 
a law school classroom that aspires to embrace diversity, as Quintilian’s class-
room explicitly did not.90 Professor Tiscione informs us that the essential sub-
jects of liberal arts include “law, politics, history, poetry, and oratory”91 and 
goes on to say, “the social sciences, such as political science, sociology, and 
psychology ‘provide the most useful analogies for the academic study of law 
. . . .’ ”92 Liberal arts education teaches “flexibility, creativity, critical thinking, 
and communication skills, as well as skills in analysis and written communica-
tion.”93 Professor Clark suggests: 
Persuasion . . . should not be understood as an exercise in argument and counter-
argument, as if it were a tennis match—won by hitting shots an adversary is un-
able to return. Instead, persuasion is best thought of as a process of making or 
finding space for a given outcome in another person’s world view. Rather than 
looking for arguments an adversary will be unable to deny, we should look for 
arguments an adversary will be able to affirm. This in turn depends upon devel-
 
86  See id. at 842. 
87  Donald Phillip Verene, Vichian Moral Philosophy: Prudence as Jurisprudence, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2008). In the twentieth century, Justice Felix Frankfurter con-
curred in the necessity of the liberal education: “ ‘[T]he best way to prepare for the law is to 
come to the study of law as a well-read person.’ Why so? One answer may be that well-read 
lawyers will, on the whole, be able to argue more persuasively.” Sherman J. Clark, Literate 
Lawyering: An Essay on Imagination and Persuasion, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 575, 575 (1990) 
(quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, U.S., to M. Paul Claussen, Jr. (May 
1954). 
88  Michael Frost, Justice Scalia’s Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia’s  
Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY. L. J. 167, 190 (2002). 
89  Scallen, supra note 6, at 890. 
90  Id. 
91  Tiscione, supra note 2, at 385, 391. 
92  Id. at 396 (quoting Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to  
Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 606, 636 (2007)). 
93  Rebecca Flanagan, The Kids Aren’t Alright: Rethinking the Law Student Skills Deficit, 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 135, 148 (2015) (quoting Carol T. Christ, Myth: A Liberal Arts Educa-
tion is Becoming Irrelevant, 2012 AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. 29, https://www.smith.edu 
/docs/president/Spring2012Christ.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDS8-MAYX]); Steven Brint et al.,  
From the Liberal to the Practical Arts in American Colleges and Universities: Organiza-
tional Analysis and Curricular Change, 76 J. HIGHER EDUC. 151, 152 (2005). 
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oping as full and nuanced as possible an understanding of that adversary’s view 
of the world. Thus, persuasion depends upon imagination, and in particular upon 
a certain imaginative capacity to see the world from the perspective of others. 
Reading may be the best way to develop that capacity.94 
Those grounded in an understanding of the human experience, as taught by 
history and literature, will be the most effective advocates.95 Furthermore, the 
liberal disciplines shed light on particular aspects of jurisprudence: the natural 
sciences impact evidence and criminal burden of proof; sociology and econom-
ics elucidate our legal processes and institutions.96 These imperatives coincide 
with an era in which commentators lament the lack of classical liberal arts edu-
cation most law students receive in high school and college.97 Legal education 
should engage in grassroots efforts to encourage liberal arts study in its student 
pipeline and value such study, by rewarding it in the admission process. Per-
haps, more importantly, law professors can work to fill the gaps in students’ 
knowledge base by encouraging consideration of humanistic, scientific, and so-
cial scientific principles in classroom discussion and in student assessment in-
struments, rather than opting, as they might, to consider these tangential matters 
to a Langdellian dialogue or legal analysis. 
D. Writing Across the Curriculum 
Writing is a necessary companion to any legal thought, and it is every-
body’s baby. Hence, its instruction takes a village, and herein is born the idea 
of Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC), where the teaching and development 
of student writing skills is situated in a variety of educational subjects, rather 
than siloed exclusively in its own classroom as an independent subject.98 This 
was Quintilian’s pedagogical ideal and one increasingly embraced by modern 
educators. Professor Andrew Bourelle posits that WAC’s “ultimate goal is to 
have students do a lot of writing, in many classes, and in every major” so that 
writing and rhetoric itself become—in Quintilian fashion—an integral part of 
learning at every level.99 
WAC is gaining momentum in prominent contemporary critiques of legal 
education as an antidote to compartmentalized, myopic legal thought: 
 
94  Clark, supra note 87, at 575. 
95  Waicukauski, supra note 63, at 31. 
96  Kara Abramson, “Art for a Better Life:” A New Image of American Legal Education, 
2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 227, 241 (2007). James Boyd White expounds on the law student 
“ ‘as an artist’ who is ‘as free’ as the sculptor or painter in what she or he does as a lawyer.” 
Id. at 252 (quoting JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION xxv (abr. Ed., I. Chi. Press 
1985)). 
97  Viator, supra note 55, at 753 (2012). 
98  Andrew Bourelle, Lessons from Quintilian: Writing and Rhetoric Across the Curriculum 
for the Modern University, 1 CURRENTS TEACHING & LEARNING 28, 29 (2009). 
99  Id. at 29, 32. 
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The . . . movement embraces the idea that thinking and writing are inseparable, 
that students must think clearly to write clearly. Despite resistance in much of 
the doctrinal law curriculum, many legal writing texts and first-year writing 
courses have followed WAC theory and moved from focusing on the written 
product to the writing process that creates knowledge.100 
Thus, as many law schools are increasingly recognizing, and as is increas-
ingly enshrined in the legal education standards promulgated by the American 
Bar Association, legal education should broaden students’ opportunities for 
writing across all its learning venues. 
E. Relationship of Teacher to Student 
Quintilian espoused the cultivation of a trusting and supportive teacher-
pupil relationship, which he felt should be that of “a loving father [to a] devot-
ed son,” as essential to an effective learning process.101 “[L]earning is best in-
spired by love, not fear.”102 Quintilian would have been horrified by versions of 
the Socratic Method conducted through degrading, trial-by-fire ministrations.103 
A return to the Quintilian ethic in this area would be commensurate with the 
burgeoning movement to humanize legal education.104 
F. Quintilian’s Take on the Aristotelian Trifecta 
Lessons in classical rhetorical theory often begin with Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
dividing theoretical analysis “into three categories: logical argument (logos), 
emotional argument (pathos), and ethical appeal or credibility (ethos).”105 
These were the three pisteis, or means of persuasion.106 Logos has always been 
the beating heart of modern legal education. But, as the upstart that he was, 
logos was not Quintilian’s focus. 
1. Pathos 
“[T]he power of eloquence is greatest in emotional appeals,” and “this 
emotional power . . . dominates the court[;] it is this form of eloquence that is 
queen of all.”107 Professor Murray has noted that Quintilian gives significant 
 
100  Barbara J. Busharis & Suzanne E. Rowe, The Gordian Knot: Uniting Skills and Sub-
stance in Employment Discrimination and Federal Taxation Courses, 33 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 303, 307–08 (2000). 
101  Scallen, supra note 6, at 846–47. 
102  Id. at 847. 
103  Id. at 847 n.141. 
104  See Michael Hunter Schwartz, Humanizing Legal Education: An Introduction to a Sym-
posium Whose Time Came, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 235 (2008). 
105  Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 86 (1994) (citing 
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 8 (Lane Cooper trans., 1932)). 
106  ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 31 n.11 (George A. Kennedy 
ed. & trans., 1991). 
107  Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note 105, at 91. 
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focus to knowledge of audience and of the judge and to tempering the use of 
logic with an appropriate emotional appeal.108 Quintilian also spoke of charm 
and personal appeal, the “well-timed smile, a laugh, a courteous bow.”109 In 
short, “rhetorical ornament[s] contribute[] not a little to the furtherance of our 
case . . . . For when our audience find[s] it a pleasure to listen, their attention 
and their readiness to believe what they hear are both alike increased . . . .”110 
Law school professors should teach their students that artful and sophisticated 
appeal to emotion in their legal arguments is not a tangential frivolity, but ra-
ther a co-equal in Aristotle’s persuasive triumvirate, for “hate, love, pity, anger, 
impatience, boredom, and inattentiveness affect a judge or jury’s reasoning 
abilities and legal decisions.”111 
2. The Lawyer as a Good Person—Ethos as a Pillar of Advocacy 
Education  
“A good man, skilled in speaking”112 
 
The perfect orator “is in the very nature of things the greatest and most im-
portant, that is, he must be a good man.”113 Flying in the face of the modern 
trope of lawyer as shark, Quintilian is perhaps best remembered for his insist-
ence that the concept of “ ‘legal ethics’ was not an oxymoron”;114 Quintilian 
represents the apotheosis of the Isocratic and Ciceronion ideal, in service to the 
client and society, that eloquence and ethics are inseparable.115 
For it is impossible to regard those men as gifted with intelligence who on being 
offered the choice between the two paths of virtue and of vice choose the latter, 
nor can we allow them prudence, when by the unforeseen issue of their own ac-
tions they render themselves liable not merely to the heaviest penalties of the 
laws, but to the inevitable torment of an evil conscience.116 
Moreover, the orator could be trained in ethics, but, when he speaks, he 
must also personally embrace the truth of what he is saying.117 Hearkening 
 
108  Michael D. Murray, Visual Rhetoric: Topics of Invention and Arrangement and Tropes 
of Style, 21 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 185, 198 n.55. 
109  PAUL M. SANDLER, THE ART OF PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON RHETORIC IN THE COURTROOM 
11–12 (n.d.) (ebook) https://www.shapirosher.com/img/headers/The-Art-of-Persuasion-Sa 
ndler.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZM4-DFYB] (last visited Feb. 25, 2020). 
110  3 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA bk. VIII 213 (H.E. Butler trans., 1966). 
111  Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note 105, at 89. 
112  4 THE INSTITUTIO ORATORIA OF QUINTILIAN, supra note 58, bk. XII at 355. Quintilian  
attributed the origins of the phrase to Marcus Cato. Id. 
113  Id. 
114  See Scallen, supra note 6, at 846, 848. 
115  Id. at 846. 
116  4 THE INSTITUTIO ORATORIA OF QUINTILIAN bk. XII, supra note 58, at 357. 
117  Jennifer Fowler-Hermes, Improving Persuasive Effects in the Courtroom: An Application  
of Rhetorical Theory, 24 AM. J TRIAL ADVOC. 313, 315–16 (2000). 
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back to Aristotle, Quintilian lauds moral character as the “first kind of proof”118 
in any argument. 
His conviction in this dovetails nicely with the latter day clarion call of the 
Carnegie Report.119 One of its prescribed core tasks of professional education 
in the Carnegie Report is to instruct law students in the process and importance 
of ethical decision-making, particularly under “conditions of uncertainty.”120 
“[T]he law school years constitute a powerful moral apprenticeship.”121 Com-
petency in ethical decision-making is also enshrined in the American Bar Asso-
ciation’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct,122 as well as the landmark 
work, Best Practices for Legal Education.123 Thus, even where law schools 
center their pedagogy in logical arguments, morality is fundamental to persua-
sion, and any attempt to exclude or marginalize its discussion in law school 
classrooms is likely to prove futile.124 Normativity provides “the interface be-
tween facts and values.”125 The Carnegie Report praises integrative teaching 
methods precisely because they unite Aristotelian ideals.126 
The development of judgment should not be divorced from the cultivation 
of morality.127 Not unlike what modern legal ethicists would argue, Quintilian 
intended rhetoric to be the servant of public virtues, such as “defending the 
truth, protecting the innocent, and deterring criminal activity.”128 The great 
Roman rhetors took as read that the principle vehicle through which an orator 
can influence his audience is his active participation in the processes of gov-
 
118  Thora Ilin Bayer, Vico’s Principle of Sensus Communis and Forensic Eloquence, 83  
CHI. KENT L. REV. 1131, 1153 (2008). Professor Christopher Rideout asserts: “Indeed, for  
many rhetoricians, the role of character in persuasion is primary.” J. Christopher Rideout,  
Ethos, Character, and Discoursal Self in Persuasive Legal Writing, 21 J. LEGAL WRITING  
INST. 19, 19 (2016). “[I]t leads to the best truth in human affairs.” Tiscione, supra note 2, at  
390. 
119  See William M. Sullivan et.al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of 
Law Summary, The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 3, 5, 7 http://a 
rchive.carnegiefoundation.org/pdfs/elibrary/elibrary_pdf_632.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WZN-4 
9RG] (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) (describing the background, importance, and major find-
ings of the Carnegie Report). 
120  The Carnegie Report, supra note 45, at 22. 
121  Id. at 139. 
122  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl Par. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
123  See ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A 
ROADMAP 45 (2007). 
124  Clare Keefe Coleman, Teaching the Torture Memos: “Making Decisions Under Condi-
tions of Uncertainty”, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 81, 88 (2012). 
125  Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First Rodney 
King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
126  The Carnegie Report, supra note 45, at 12–14. 
127  See Angela Olivia Burton, Cultivating Ethical, Socially Responsible Lawyer Judgment: 
Introducing the Multiple Intelligences Paradigm into the Clinical Setting, 11 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 15, 18 (2004). 
128  Robert W. Scholla, Fides Quarens Iustitiam Socialem: A Jesuit Law School Perspective, 
37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1209, 1219 n.50 (2004). 
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ernment, putting the interests of the body politic over his own.129 Likewise, 
Professor Perelman argues that, into modernity, we want both legal scholars 
and practicing lawyers to be engaged with what the law ought to be.130 
Quintilian was steadfast in his assertion that ethics is a matter for educa-
tion; moral judgment is not fixed and immutable.131 Modern social sciences re-
search corroborates that students commence their legal studies on par with the 
general population in their moral development, but that morality can grow from 
that point,132 “nurtured and inspired by example and reflection.”133 Legal edu-
cators could intentionally integrate the very rigors of Quintilian’s exacting rhe-
torical education to train the character of our own young rhetors. Quintilian was 
a Cassandra, clinging to “rhetoric, ethics, and civic responsibility in the face of 
a crumbling society.”134 He could be an avatar in a modern society similarly 
accused. 
IV. “O QUINTILIAN, SUPREME GUIDE OF UNSETTLED YOUTH”!135 
Quintilian was an oxymoron incarnate, a liberal lauded by an incipiently 
imperialist society. The tradition of Roman rhetorical education was a social 
equalizer and stepping stone of opportunity, “the primary vehicle for changes in 
status by those not part of the Roman elite,”136 intended to “promot[e] acquisi-
tion of mental and physical practices that were conceptually and practically 
standard, regardless of the speaker’s origin.”137 However, as previously dis-
cussed in Part II of this Article, Quintilian’s broadness of mind was, per force, 
encumbered by the cultural imperatives of his time.138 His pupils were the so-
cial climbing nouveau riche like Cicero or provincials like himself, always, at 
minimum, “members of the educated classes.”139 The notion that the mores and 
affects of the elite were to be aped by those aspiring to be them was deeply in-
grained in Classical Roman society, and deviation from this advice would be 
 
129  Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 
AM. U. L. REV.1717, 1729 (1995). 
130  See Tiscione, supra note 2, at 388 (citing CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE 
NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 31–32 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver 
trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1969)). 
131  See O’Regan, supra note 73, at 419. 
132  See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney 
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1396–97 (1997). 
133  Scallen, supra note 6, at 819. 
134  Id. at 845–46. 
135  QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING OF SPEAKING AND WRITING, supra note 3, at li n.16. 
136  See O’Regan, supra note 73, at 418. 
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138  Supra Part II. 
139  Frost, supra note 15, at 616, 625. 
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met with “remark[], ridicule[], and punish[ment] at every level of Roman edu-
cation and practice.”140 
We may yet argue over what has changed. This embrace of the primacy of 
homogenizing acculturation persists into the modern legal education and is 
well-nigh all-encompassing: “Just as learning to think like a lawyer involves 
jettisoning languages of social class, ethnic origin, and so forth, learning to act 
like a lawyer involves jettisoning previous methods of non-verbal communica-
tion.”141 
Opportunities to partake in Quintilian’s panacea have historically been lim-
ited. The receipt of a liberal education and training in the classics, on which the 
entirety of rhetorical education is premised, was, until very recently, only avail-
able to white, male graduates of elite universities.142 
Indeed, we still celebrate the remaking of our students, as they learn to 
“think like a lawyer,”143 and to act and appear like one too: “Law colleges af-
firm in practice and pedagogy the surviving, ancient link between rationality 
and elite decorum, and, more covertly, between irrationality and other forms of 
non-verbal communication.”144 We therefore are urging a homogeneity among 
fledgling lawyers,145 now garbed in navy blue suits instead of togas. 
But even as modern commentators begin to question this norm, perhaps the 
visionary and revolutionary Quintilian’s progressive vision for social advance-
ment would also have evolved, were he living today: 
As Isocrates would be the first to acknowledge, the times do change. My stu-
dents are neither all men nor all young. We now admit women and older (“re-
turning”) students to law school. Scholars and teachers . . . should try to become 
better citizen-lawyers in the tradition of Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian, and 
should try to help their audiences, whether students or readers, become better 
citizen-lawyers too.146 
As legal scholars and educators call for new, more inclusive, and integrated 
models for legal education,147 an understanding of Quintilian—tempered by a 
sober understanding that liberalism must take different forms in different 
eras—proffers a paradigm that merits our modern consideration and explora-
tion in the law school classroom. 
The good man speaking well that we legal educators seek to mold may no 
longer look as Quintilian envisioned (or even be a man), but would still, in the 
 
140  O’Regan, supra note 73, at 419. Indeed, Quintilian himself mocked orators through the 
ages who overstepped and embraced a too-folksy or populist demeanor or persona. 4 THE 
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143  See O’Regan, supra note 73, at 418. 
144  Id. at 421. 
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147  See STUCKEY, supra note 123, at 1; The Carnegie Report, supra note 45, at 45. 
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end, benefit from the conscious imparting, in the classroom and in the court-
room, of the wisdom of two millennia, as told by history’s first true law profes-
sor. 
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